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A B S T R A C T
The EU introduced a new security of gas supply regulation in November 2017, which now replaced the security
of gas supply regulation of 2010. This article is providing a critical assessment of the new Regulation (EU) 2017/
1938. Many instruments of the predecessor Regulation (EU) 994/2010 will stay in place unchanged and those
have been discussed elsewhere. This contribution will, hence, focus on the novelties and changes that Regulation
(EU) 2017/1938 is bringing about.
After some introductory remarks on the structure and the aims of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938, the current
article will proceed by discussing the two main novelties of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938, which shall implement
the main thrust of the new regulation: imposing obligatory solidarity between Member States in a gas crisis.
These are ﬁrst, the grouping of directly connected Member States into so called risk groups and second the new
article 13 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938, which spells out concrete solidarity measures that Member States have
to take. In a third step other novelties of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 will be highlighted and critically reﬂected
upon before the article is wrapped up with some conclusions.
1. Introduction
The key to understanding the change in attitude of the EU towards
its security of gas supplies and the resulting legislation are the 2006 and
2009 Russia-Ukraine gas crises. These crises used law and contractual
obligations as 'weapons' for what, in reality, was an energy policy
issue.1 The Ukraine and Russia were at odds about the gas price and
how to verify the correct amount of deliveries of gas to Ukraine and to
Europe via a transit pipeline.2 As both countries could not agree on the
facts the result, from a European perspective, was a substantial down-
fall in the amount of gas that reached Europe during the 2006 and
particularly the 2009 gas dispute. This downfall forced, inter alia, Ita-
lian and German gas-ﬁred power plants to perform emergency shut
downs.3
Those events were a pivotal turning point in legal thinking about
European gas security of supply. Prior to the crises an almost `laissez-
faire approach` to gas security was taken at EU level. By and large EU
Member States were considered as being responsible for safeguarding
their own gas supplies. The crises exposed their vulnerabilities, as they
largely relied upon nationalistic approaches to gas security. Thus, the
recognition that coherent and increasingly stringent measures are
needed at EU level to guarantee the supply of gas throughout the Union
gained momentum. The EU institutions assessed that new measures
were needed and that habits need to be changed.
To avoid further replication of the 2006 and 2009 crises the
European Commission, Parliament and Council decided to act and in
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1 Jonathan Stern `The Russian-Ukraine Gas Crisis of January 2006`(Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2006) 9, 14; Simon Pirani, Jonathan Stern and Katja
Yaﬁmava `The Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute of January 2009: a comprehensive assessment` (Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2008) 8, 19–25, 55; Matthias
Neumann, Heiko Pleines and Henning Schröder `Russland Analysen Erdgaskonﬂikt mit der Ukraine` [2009] No 176 Forschungsstelle Osteuropa an der Universität
Bremen available at: http://www.laender-analysen.de/russland/pdf/Russlandanalysen176.pdf [accessed 18/July/2013] 4/5.
2 Jonathan Stern `The Russian-Ukraine Gas Crisis of January 2006`(Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2006) 9, 14; Simon Pirani, Jonathan Stern and Katja
Yaﬁmava `The Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute of January 2009: a comprehensive assessment` (Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2008) 8, 19–25, 55; Matthias
Neumann, Heiko Pleines and Henning Schröder `Russland Analysen Erdgaskonﬂikt mit der Ukraine` [2009] No 176 Forschungsstelle Osteuropa an der Universität
Bremen available at: http://www.laender-analysen.de/russland/pdf/Russlandanalysen176.pdf [accessed 18/July/2013] 4/5.
3 Jonathan Stern `The Russian-Ukraine Gas Crisis of January 2006`(Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2006) 9, 14; Simon Pirani, Jonathan Stern and Katja
Yaﬁmava `The Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute of January 2009: a comprehensive assessment` (Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2008) 8, 19–25, 55; Matthias
Neumann, Heiko Pleines and Henning Schröder `Russland Analysen Erdgaskonﬂikt mit der Ukraine` [2009] No 176 Forschungsstelle Osteuropa an der Universität
Bremen available at: http://www.laender-analysen.de/russland/pdf/Russlandanalysen176.pdf [accessed 18/July/2013] 4/5.
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2010 put into place Regulation (EU) 994/2010, 4 as an explicit response
to this political crises.5 This pioneering piece of legislation has now
been replaced by a new security of gas supply regulation in November
2017.6 It has to be pointed out that these two regulations are the only
legal instruments that are directly imposing strictly binding rules on all
EU Member States on gas security of supply. Before these two regula-
tions, gas security of supply was mainly governed by the soft-touch
rules of Directive 2004/677 and was considered to be largely provided
for by the principles governing the internal European energy market.8
The particularities are discussed in more depth below in this article.
The new Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 is, thus, the successor to
Regulation (EU) 994/2010 and is supposed to deal with its perceived
shortcomings. Many instruments of the predecessor Regulation (EU)
994/2010 will stay in place unchanged and those have been discussed
elsewhere.9 This contribution, hence, focusses on the novelties and
changes that Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 is bringing about.
As this is a legal paper some words on legal methodology might be
of interest to the reader. A genuine understanding of how regulation
addresses the issue of gas supply security in Europe may not be
achieved by superﬁcial reading and comparison of paragraphs. The law
texts rather need to be interpreted in the light of their respective con-
texts in order to distil the genuine meaning of a norm.10 Two hundred
years ago Friedrich Carl von Savigny developed a rigorous methodology
of legal interpretation, which is based on four `canons´, or methods.11
These methods have been widely accepted in the comparative law lit-
erature12 and are still in use today all over the world.13 The four
methods consist of grammatical interpretation (the interpretation of the
wording of the law) and systematic interpretation (the logical interac-
tion of diﬀerent pieces of the law among themselves and with the
overall legal system). 14 They also comprise historical interpretation
(considering the legal situation and pertaining circumstances at the
point in time when the law was enacted) and teleological interpretation
(interpretation in view of the underlying aims and rationale of the
law).15 The current analysis is the result of an application of this
methodology to the text of the new Gas Security of Supply Regulation
(EU) 2017/1938. Its predecessor has been analysed with the help of a
comparable methodology by Silke Goldberg15 and the present article
could, hence, be viewed as a logical continuation of her sublime ana-
lysis of the old Regulation (EU) 994/2010.
After providing a background on the development of Regulation
(EU) 2017/1938, the article is starting oﬀ with some remarks on its
structure and aims. The reader then learns more about the main novelty
that Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 is bringing about in comparison to its
predecessor: the imposition of obligatory solidarity between Member
States in a gas crisis. This shall be achieved by two means, which are
discussed in depth: ﬁrst, directly connected Member States are being
clustered into so called risk groups and second, the new article 13 of
Regulation (EU) 2017/1938, spelling out concrete solidarity measures
that Member States have to take in case of an emergency. The article
concludes with some observations on policy implications of the new
means, situating the new regulation on gas supply solidarity within the
concepts of energy justice and `just` transitions.16
2. Background
The EU deemed it necessary to introduce a new security of gas
supply regulation after the Commission investigated the implementa-
tion of Regulation (EU) 994/2010 in October 2014. Although the EU
insists that the old Regulation (EU) 994/2010 had a `signiﬁcant positive
impact` on the security of gas supply in the Union,17 the October 2014
4 Regulation (EU) 994/2010 of 20 October 2010 concerning measures to
safeguard security of gas supply and repealing Council Directive 2004/67/EC
[2010] OJ L 295/1 (hereinafter: Regulation (EU) 994/2010).
5 European Commission, Commission Staﬀ Working Document accom-
panying to the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council concerning measures to safeguard security of gas supply and repealing.
Directive 2004/67/EC `The January 2009 Gas Supply Disruption to the EU: An
Assessment´ COM (2009) 977 ﬁnal page 7.
6 Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 25 October 2017 concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply
and repealing Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 [2017] OJ L280/1 (hereinafter:
Regulation (EU) 2017/1938).
7 Directive 2004/67/EC of 26 April 2004 concerning measures to safeguard
security of natural gas.
supply [2004] OJ L127/92. Directive 2004/67 was the ﬁrst attempt to deal
with the issue of security of gas supply, but did not succeed, partly due to its
nature as a Directive (not immediately applicable and enforceable in the
Member States national law).
8 See for example preamble 22 and art. 1 (32), 3 (5) and (7) or art. 5 Directive
2009/73/EC of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market
in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC.
9 Silke Muter Goldberg `Chapter IV Regulation 994/2010: A Measure to
Improve The Security of Gas Supply in The EU?` in Martha M Roggenkamp and
Ulf Hammer `European Energy Law Report VIII` (Intersentia, Cambridge 2011)
61–92 (hereinafter: Goldberg); Silke Muter Goldberg `Security of Supply in the
context of European Energy Market Liberalisation – a Brief Overview` (2011) 4
International Business Law Journal 433–462 in particular 438 et sqq.
10 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz and Tony Weir `Introduction to comparative
law` 3rd edition (Clarendon, Oxford 1998) 35/36 (hereinafter: Zweigert/Kötz/
Weir).
11 Friedrich Carl von Savigny `System des heutigen römischen Rechts Band I`
(Veit, Berlin 1840) 212–214 (hereinafter: Savigny).
12 Heiko Sauer `Juristische Methodenlehre` in Julian Krüper (edt.)
`Grundlagen des Rechts` 2nd edition (Nomos, Baden-Baden 2013) § 9 paragraph
17 (hereinafter: Krüper); Karl Larenz `Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft` 2nd
edition ( Springer, Berlin 1991) 231 Larenz 231.
13 Günter Hager `Rechtsmethoden in Europa` (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2009)
26/27 and 37 (hereinafter: Hager); Krüper § 9 para. 5; Jean-Louis Bergel
`Méthodologie juridique` (Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 2001) 231 et
sqq.; Jean-Louis Bergel `Théorie générale du droit` 4th edition (Dalloz, Paris
2003) No 231 et sqq.; the German Federal Constitutional Court ruled that
(footnote continued)
Savigny`s means of legal interpretation must be adhered to by all users of the
law and that a conclusion from interpreting a norm which was not reached by
one of these methods is invalid, see: BVerfGE 93, 37 (81); 113, 88 (104).
14 Savigny 212–214.
15 Goldberg.
16More on those concepts can be found at Raphael J Heﬀron and Darren
McCauley `The concept of energy justice across the disciplines`105 (2017)
Energy Policy 658–667 (hereinafter: Heﬀron/McCauley 2017);Benjamin K.
Sovacool and Michael H. Dworkin `Global Energy Justice` (Cambridge University
Press 2014); Raphael J. Heﬀron and Darren McCauley `What is the `Just
Transition`?` 88 (2018) Geoforum 74–77 (hereinafter: Heﬀron/McCauley
2018).
17 Preamble 4 of the new Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. The preamble is re-
ferencing the E-Directive (Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal
market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC (OJ L 211, 14.8.2009,
p. 55)), the G-Directive (Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market
in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC (OJ L 211, 14.8.2009, p.
94)), the ACER-Regulation (Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing an Agency for the
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (OJ L 211, 14.8.2009, p. 1)), the E-
Regulation (Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to the network for cross-
border exchanges in electricity and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003
(OJ L 211, 14.8.2009, p. 15)), the G-Regulation (Regulation (EC) No 715/2009
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions for
access to the natural gas transmission networks and repealing Regulation (EC)
No 1775/2005 (OJ L 211, 14.8.2009, p. 36))and Regulation 994/2010
(Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 20 October 2010 concerning measures to safeguard security of gas supply
and repealing Council Directive 2004/67/EC (OJ L 295, 12.11.2010, p. 1)).
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report18 identiﬁed areas in which improvements could further bolster
the security of gas supplies to the Union.
At the same time the European Network of Transmission Network
Operators for Gas (ENTSO-G)19 conducted a gas `stress test´ on the
functioning of the gas infrastructure in Europe and the results were
published in the same document on the same day in October 2014.20
The results highlighted that purely national approaches are not very
eﬀective in the event of severe disruption.21 In particular a reiteration
of the Russian/Ukrainian gas crises of 2006 and 2009 or a technical
failure of equipment that causes gas supply via Ukraine to stop would
have severe impacts on East and South-East European Member States.22
But ENTSO-G did not stop at making this and other assessments.
They also demonstrated how a more cooperative approach among
Member States could signiﬁcantly reduce the impact of very severe gas
disruptions in the most vulnerable Member States, according to their
geographic location and gas sourcing options.23 The Commission is
explicitly referring to this when justifying the introduction of Regula-
tion (EU) 2017/1938 in its preamble.24
The Commission further underpins its decision to introduce a new
security of gas supply regulation by reference to the Energy Union
Strategy of 25 February 2015, which highlighted that an Energy Union,
initially set up to give the EU one common voice towards Russia, de-
pends on solidarity and trust as necessary features of energy security.25
Indeed, this 2015 document explicitly states that
` Solidarity among Member States, in particular in times of supply crisis,
has to be strengthened. These issues and the experience gained in the
implementation of the Regulation will be taken into account when pro-
posing a revision of the Security of Gas Supply Regulation.`26
This is what the European Commission subsequently did by
launching a ﬁrst draft proposal in February 2016,27 which focused very
much on solidarity and which went on to eventually become Regulation
(EU) 2017/1938, roughly one and a half years later.
3. Structure and aims of Regulation 2017/1938
The structure of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 follows from the fact
that the main instruments of its predecessor Regulation (EU) 994/2010
have been preserved and transferred to the new regulation. 28 However,
the structure of the new document has been streamlined and now ﬂows
more logically compared to its predecessor.
Article 1 Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 is providing the overall aims
of the Regulation, which have not changed much when compared to the
predecessor regulation. Security of gas supply, in the view of the
European Union, is primarily linked to the proper functioning of the
internal gas market.29 However, the Regulation allows for exceptional
measures if the market can no longer deliver the amount of gas that is
required. The regulation shall provide a clear deﬁnition and attribution
of responsibilities and provide for coordination of planning and re-
sponses to emergencies at national, regional and Union level.30
The new article 3 is key to understanding Regulation (EU) 2017/
1938, as it establishes responsibilities for the security of gas supply. In
general the three-level approach of Regulation (EU) 994/2010 is being
continued, which allocates responsibility for the security of gas supplies
ﬁrst, to the relevant natural gas undertakings (and electricity under-
takings where appropriate), second, to the Member States and third, to
the Union.31 An interesting detail here is the inclusion of electricity
undertakings in the chain of responsible actors, as they were not in-
cluded in the old Regulation (EU) 994/2010.32
This is part of a bigger mission of the Commission to include elec-
tricity undertakings and industry more into the scope of the new se-
curity of gas supplies Regulation (EU) 2017/1938.33 With these mea-
sures the Commission is trying to pre-empt a future where more gas
ﬁred power plants are built/running in Europe so that large amounts of
gas would be needed for electricity production, which in turn would
need to be secured on the markets and these additional amounts of gas
could worsen a gas crisis.
Alongside the three main actors, the three diﬀerent levels of crisis
have also been maintained (early warning, alert and emergency level)
and are now established as a separate article, new article 11 regulation
(EU) 2017/1938. However, an interesting change occurred in the
question who is eligible for declaring a crisis level. Under the old article
18 Commission Staﬀ Working Document `Report on the implementation of
Regulation (EU) 994/2010 and its contribution to solidarity and preparedness
for gas disruptions in the EU` SWD(2014) 325 ﬁnal (hereinafter SWD Gas
Security 2014).
19 ENTSO-G is the European Network of Transmission Network Operators for
Gas, which aims to enhance cooperation between national gas transmission
system operators (TSOs) across Europe in order to ensure the development of a
pan-European transmission system in line with European Union energy goals.
For details see www.entsog.eu [accessed 19/March/2018].
20 Commission and Council `Communication on the short term resilience of
the European gas system.
Preparedness for a possible disruption of supplies from the East during the
fall and winter of 2014/2015` SWD(2014) 322–326 ﬁnal (hereinafter: Stress
Test 2014).
21 Stress Test 2014 at 17/18; SWD Gas Security 2014 at 15 and 17.
22 Stress Test 2014 at 7–9.
23 Stress Test 2014 at 7–9.
24 Preamble 5 Regulation (EU) 2017/1938.
25 Preamble 6 Regulation (EU) 2017/1938; Commission Communication ` A
Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking
Climate Change Policy` COM(2015) 80 ﬁnal at 4 (hereinafter: Energy Union).
26 Energy Union para. 2.1.
27 Commission `Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of
the Council concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and
repealing Regulation (EU) No 994/2010` COM (2016) 52 ﬁnal (hereinafter:
ﬁrst draft and explanatory memorandum).
28 For example, article 3 (responsibility for the security of gas supply) is now
(footnote continued)
followed by article 4 on the Gas Coordination Group (which was discussed only
at the back of the old regulation in article 12). Furthermore, the Infrastructure
and the Gas supply standard have been brought more to the front of the reg-
ulation and directly follow each other (was articles 6 and 8 and now in the new
regulation articles 5 and 6), the risk assessments, which shall function as a
central tool for mitigating security of gas supply risks have been moved to the
front of the regulation (was article 9 now article 7) and ﬁnally, emergency plans
and the declaration of a crisis level, two distinct things that used to be part of
the same article have now been split over two articles (was article 10 now
articles10 and 11).
29 Article 1 Regulation (EU) 2017/1938.
30 Article 1 Regulation (EU) 2017/1938.
31 Compare article 3 (1) and (4) Regulation (EU) 994/2010 to article 3 (1) (4)
of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938.
32 Compare article 3 (1) and (4) Regulation (EU) 994/2010 to article 3 (1) (4)
of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938.
33 There are a number of examples for the inclusion of electricity into the gas
security of supply Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. Article 5 (8) Regulation (EU)
2017/1938 for instance prescribes that the integration between electricity and
gas systems shall be taken into consideration when searching for bottlenecks
and assessing the impacts of the failure of the single largest gas infrastructure. A
further example is the fact that electricity producers have to be consulted to
draw up preventive gas action and gas emergency plans, see article 8 (2)
Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. Moreover, the preventive gas action plans under
article 9 Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 must include a deﬁnition of protected
customer and, again, electricity undertakings are now included in the list of
entities on which an obligation can be imposed in case of a crisis, see article 9
(1) (b) Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. The provision on emergency plans include
similar alterations: electricity (TSO for electricity where relevant) has been
included in the preparation phase of the plan, an integrated view of the op-
eration of energy systems across electricity and gas has to be adopted and
electricity undertakings can have reporting obligations, see article 10 (1) (b) (l)
(k) Regulation (EU) 2017/1938.
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10 (5) Regulation (EU) 994/2010 only Competent Authorities were
allowed to do this. Under the new Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 the
Competent Authorities can delegate certain important tasks to TSOs,
DSOs or other public authorities,34 which includes the declaration of a
crisis level.35 In case of delegation the Competent Authorities then have
to supervise the e.g. TSO and the delegation must be made explicit in
the preventive action and the emergency plan.36 However, the Com-
petent Authorities remain in charge of declaring the end of one of the
crises levels and shall inform the Commission and Competent Autho-
rities of directly connected Member States about their decision.37
4. Risk groups and the solidarity mechanism – the two main new
features of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938
At the heart of the new Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 lie two main
features. On the one hand the Regulation is introducing the concept of
risk groups for gas supply threats, on the other hand a new solidarity
mechanism for gas crises is being introduced. While the risk groups are
discussed immediately below in Section 4.1, the new solidarity me-
chanism is assessed afterwards in Section 4.2.
4.1. Risk groups
4.1.1. The creation of risk groups
The ﬁrst major innovation of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 is the
creation of risk groups for gas supply. The risk groups have been es-
tablished on the basis of gas supply routes, supply country risks and the
cohesion of capabilities to exchange gas.38 The main criterion for
grouping countries together was, hence, whether or not they have a
common supplier of gas and a common gas supply route.39 As a con-
sequence, only directly interconnected Member States have been clus-
tered into gas supply risk groups.40 These risk groups shall serve as
basis for enhanced regional cooperation and agreement on eﬀective
cross-border measures.41
Annex I of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 establishes 13 risk groups,
clustered into 4 categories (Eastern Gas, North Sea Gas, North African
Gas and South-East Gas). Countries can be part of several risk groups
across diﬀerent categories.42 To give an example: the Netherlands are
included on the one hand in the category `Eastern Gas´ in the risk
groups concerning deliveries via
• Belarus and
• The Baltic Sea





This reﬂects the actual reality of gas supplies to and in Europe,
which will often come from very diﬀerent sources. For North-West
Europe an interesting particularity features in Annex I 2 (b) Regulation
(EU) 2017/1938: a low-caloriﬁc gas risk group has been created, con-
sisting of Belgium, Germany, France and the Netherlands. Given the
recent decision of the Dutch government to completely shut down
Europe`s only big source of low-caloriﬁc gas, the Groningen gas ﬁeld,
by 2030 this seems sensible.43 If deliveries of low caloriﬁc gas from the
Groningen gas ﬁeld to other countries will end, it is due diligence to
create a particular risk group around this energy carrier, although it is
not concerned with gas imports into the Union.
The initial starting point for the idea of having obligatory gas supply
risk groups was ENTSO-G´s 2014 gas `stress test´,44 that has been dis-
cussed earlier. In the resulting 2014 report on the implementation of
Regulation (EU) 994/2010 the Commission painted a gloomy picture of
the functioning of regional cooperation mechanisms in a gas crisis,
stating that ´the main weakness so far, however, has been that Risk As-
sessments and Plans have remained nationally focussed only and that the co-
ordination between Member States has overall been poor´.45
This part of the document ended with a bleak assessment of the
Commission´s current powers: ´The Commission's tools to co-ordinate
actions are under the existing Regulation limited and the absence of Risk
Assessments and Plans co-ordinated between Member States at regional level
further complicate its overall co-ordination task at EU level signiﬁcantly.46
To remedy this shortcoming the Commission initially proposed the
creation of nine risk groups in the ﬁrst draft of the new security of gas
supplies regulation, dating February 2016.47 However, the Member
States started opposing this idea immediately, with ﬁve Member States
(Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and Italy) being particularly cri-
tical.48 They argued that the risk groups and the underlying regional
approach to gas security of supply were not suitable to eﬃciently ad-
dress gas emergencies, due to the great variety of importance and roles
that gas plays in the diﬀerent energy mixes of Member States.49
A good impression of the tensions is provided by the debate of the
proposal in the two chambers of the Italian parliament. Concerning the
composition of the risk groups preamble 12 Regulation 2017/1938
proposes the creation on basis of major transnational risks to security of
gas supply, that is to say clustering of Member States on basis of main
gas supply sources and along main gas supply routes. The Italian poli-
ticians, however, highlighted how the region in which Italy was initially
included did not respect these criteria in view of existing interconnec-
tions and the possibility to pool resources and balance risks for security
of gas supply across the region.50 Among the four other states included
34 Article 3 (2) Regulation (EU) 2017/1938.
35 Article 11 (2) Regulation (EU) 2017/1938.
36 Article 3 (1) and (2) Regulation (EU) 2017/1938.
37 Article 11 (8) Regulation (EU) 2017/1938.
38 European Parliament `Brieﬁng EU Legislation in Progress New rules on
security of gas supply November 2017´ page 7 available at: http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/608810/EPRS_BRI(2017)
608810_EN.pdf [accessed 26/March/2018].
39 Preamble 12 Regulation 2017/1938.
40 Article 3 (7) Regulation (EU) 2017/1938.
41 Article 3 (7) Regulation (EU) 2017/1938.
42 European Parliament `Brieﬁng EU Legislation in Progress New rules on
security of gas supply November 2017´ page 7 available at: http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/608810/EPRS_BRI(2017)
608810_EN.pdf [accessed 26/March/2018].
43 For the decision of the government see Kamerstukken II 2017/2018,
33529, nr. 457, p. 1 and 7; for the history of the Groningen gas ﬁeld see Martha
M Roggenkamp `Reducing gas production from the Groningen ﬁeld: the need to
balance safe production with supply security´ in Martha M Roggenkamp and
Catherine Banet (eds.) `European Energy Law Report Volume XI´ (Intersentia,
Cambridge 2017) 301–316.
44 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council on the short term resilience of the European gas system, Preparedness
for a possible disruption of supplies from the East during the fall and winter of
2014/2015, COM (2014) 654 ﬁnal (hereinafter: Stress Test 2014).
45 SWD Gas Security 2014 at 16.
46 SWD Gas Security 2014 at 17.
47 First Draft and explanatory memorandum.
48 Bloomberg.com ´Five Western EU Countries Seek to Soften Gas Security
Proposal´ (8 April 2016) available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2016–04-08/ﬁve-western-eu-countries-seek-to-soften-gas-security-
proposal [accessed 11/December/2017].
49 NaturalgasEurope.com `Belgium Wary of EU Gas Security Proposal´ (18
April 2016) available at: https://www.naturalgasworld.com/belgium-wary-of-
eu-gas-security-proposal-29085 [accessed 11/December/2017].
50 Senato della Repubblica Italiana ´Legislatura 17ª 14ª Commissione per-
manente, Resoconto sommario n. 186 del.
27/04/2016, Proposta di Regolamento del Parlamento europeo e del
Consiglio concernente misure volte a garantire la sicurezza
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in the then proposed South – East Region, one, Slovenia, was exempted
from the infrastructure standard,51 which means that they had to pro-
vide less assurance of robustness of their measures taken to withstand a
severe gas crisis. The Italians doubted that, in case of gas disruptions,
there would be equal burden sharing, as one Member State that is di-
rectly connected might be exempted from certain duties.52 As a result
they consider their risk-group as ill – suited to address security of gas
supply risks, arguing that not all countries included in there have to
show the robustness and eﬃcacy of their systems.53
Furthermore, there was a North-West risk group contemplated,
made up of Ireland and the UK. 54 Following the Brexit referendum of
23 June 2016 and the huge diﬃculties in determining the future border
between the UK and the EU on the Irish isle, this risk group became
obsolete.55 Due to these and other debates, the Commission amended
the composition of the risk groups and their format in the ﬁnal version
of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938.
However, this is not a decision that is set in stone. Article 3 (8)
Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 entitles the Commission to update the
composition of the risk groups to reﬂect the evolution of major trans-
national risks to the security of gas supplies for Member States.56 In
terms of decision-making on the composition of the risk groups the key
body is the Gas Coordination Group (GCG), which is made up of the
Competent Authorities of Member States, ACER, ENTSO-G, the in-
dustry, customers and representatives of the Energy Community. A
novelty concerning GCG is the so called `restricted setting´ mode, which
did not feature in Regulation (EU) 994/2010. According to article 4 (4)
Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 the GCG can be convened, upon request by
one or more Member States/Competent Authorities, in a setting that
only features the Member States and not the other parties. The GCG has
to be convened in the `restricted setting´ if the European Commission
wishes to update the composition of the risk groups.57
Possible amendments to the composition of the risk groups shall
explicitly take into account the results of a Union-wide `stress test´ that
had to be completed on the same day that the new Regulation went into
force (1 November 2017)58 and that will be discussed below in the next
section. The fact that the Commission ﬁnally established risk groups,
but simultaneously allows itself to alter their composition indicates that
the current set-up of the risk groups is unlikely to be the last word.
4.1.2. Tasks of risk groups
The main task of risk groups is the implementation of solidarity
measures under the new article 13 Regulation (EU) 2017/1938, which
will be discussed in the next section. Besides this primary obligation,
however, there is also the task for Competent Authorities of each risk
group to create a `common risk assessment´ at risk group level, besides
their (remaining) obligation to make national risk assessments, which
was already included in Regulation (EU) 994/2010.59 In order to make
that happen article 7 on Risk Assessment has been considerably refur-
bished, compared to its old form in Regulation (EU) 994/2010. They
have to be fully consistent with assumptions and results of the common
risk assessment.60
Article 7 (4) (a) Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 further obliges the
Competent Authorities to detail the N-1 formula61 at national and re-
gional level, by taking into account the interrelation of risks of diﬀerent
risk groups.62 Annexes IV and V Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 entail
detailed templates for the common and the national risk assessments,
which the Commission can alter in the wake of the `stress tests´ and in
coordination with the GCG.63 By 1 October 2018 the Member States
have to notify their ﬁrst common risk assessments to the Commission,
alongside the national risk assessments, and they are both subject to a
4-year update cycle (was 2 years in Regulation (EU) 994/2010).64
4.1.3. Membership in several risk groups
If a country is a member of several risk groups, plans must include
several regional chapters, which shall be developed jointly in the risk
group and shall also implement the results of the 2017 `stress test´.
Under the old article 4 (3) Regulation (EU) 994/2010, such regional
cooperation was encouraged, but not yet obligatory.
The Commission has a `facilitating´ role in putting these regional
chapters together.65 If the Competent Authorities (CA) cannot agree on
a coordination mechanism in the regional plans the Commission pro-
poses one for the risk group, which the Competent Authorities, then
have to take into account for a regional plan.66
According to article 8 (5) Regulation (EU) 2017/1938, there are
templates for these plans in Annexes VI and VII. The Competent
Authorities of neighbouring countries shall consult with each other on
their plans to ensure consistency.67 The plans must then be notiﬁed to
the Commission and made public at latest by 1 March 2019.68 The
Commission, then assesses the plans and can issue an opinion to the
Competent Authorities.69 It can issue an opinion if it thinks that the
plans do not comply with the obligation to not distort markets or they
hinder the eﬀective functioning of the internal market.70
In case disagreement between Competent Authorities and the
Commission on one of these plans cannot be resolved, the Competent
Authorities of the Member States concerned can diverge from the
Commission`s detailed reasons, but they need to make public the jus-
tiﬁcation underlying their position after receipt of the detailed reasons
of the Commission.71
The ﬁnal word on the outline of preventive action plans and
emergency plans72 in the regional chapters is, hence, lying with the
(footnote continued)
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Competent Authorities of the Member States and not with the Com-
mission. This might be viewed as somewhat contradictory to the overall
purpose of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 to increase solidarity and the
oversight of the Commission on coordination and planning in a crisis.73
Against this, however, can be argued that it does makes sense to give
Member States a ﬁnal say on preventive action plans and emergency
plans, as they have to be designed, and ultimately implemented by the
Member States. Leaving the `last word´ to the Competent Authorities of
Member States is justiﬁed by the principle of subsidiarity of article 5 (3)
TFEU, which prescribes that the EU shall act in areas of shared com-
petence only if and insofar as objectives of the regulatory action cannot
be suﬃciently achieved by Member States.74 The Member States will
probably be very aware of the particularities of their countries and their
risk groups, given the high importance and sensitivity that the topic of
gas supplies has for every EU country and might have more knowledge
than the Commission.
4.2. Solidarity measures of the new article 13
The second big novelty of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 is the soli-
darity clause of article 13. Member States are obliged to take certain
pre-deﬁned solidarity measures in a gas crisis. In order to fully under-
stand those measures, their implications and their rationale, it is ne-
cessary to ﬁrst take a step back and reﬂect upon solidarity and its
emergence in energy law, before assessing the measures of article 13
Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 in detail.
4.2.1. The history of solidarity in european gas security of supply legislation
Solidarity is not a new concept as such in the history of EU energy
security laws. The `spirit of solidarity´, in fact, has been called upon
many times, examples include article 194 TFEU, preamble 13 and ar-
ticle 9 (4) of Directive 2004/67,75 Preambles 5, 22, 25, 36 and articles 1
and 8 (2) of Regulation (EU) 994/2010 as well as the new article 13
Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. Particularly article 194 TFEU, which
functions as the primary law basis (the competence) for the introduc-
tion of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938,76 notes:
` In the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal
market and with regard for the need to preserve and improve the en-
vironment, Union policy on energy shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity
between Member States, to: (…) (b) ensure security of energy supply in
the Union; (…)´.77
However, this `spirit of solidarity´ is more of a programmatic
statement that does not give a concrete deﬁnition.
Outside of the energy context a concrete solidarity clause features in
article 222 TFEU. It
provides Member States and EU institutions with the possibility to
act jointly in the prevention78 and the management of terrorism, nat-
ural and man made disasters.79 The predecessor of article 222 TFEU has
been implemented in secondary legislation by the Critical Infrastructure
Directive 2008/114/EC,80 which applies to natural or man made dis-
asters.81 Here an analogy to gas supply crises could be drawn, since gas
disruptions can be the result of natural or man made disasters. How-
ever, this only holds for a tiny percentage of cases.
4.2.2. Solidarity in Regulation (EU) 994/2010 and lack of reverse ﬂow
capacity
Silke Goldberg, assessing Regulation (EU) 994/2010 back in 2011
noted that `the principle of solidarity underpins many of the obligations in
the EU Regulation´.82 However, she identiﬁed `fundamental issues´ with
the approach of the EU to solidarity, both at the concrete and the
conceptual level.83
At the concrete level, the need to install bi-directional inter-
connection capacity (or reverse ﬂow) was the only concrete solidarity
measure featuring in the old Regulation (EU) 994/2010.84 Despite the
positive assessment of Silke Goldberg back in 2011, stating that `it may
prove to be this provision that gives the Regulation its bite´, developments
went slowly.85 The share of bi – directional interconnections has in-
creased from 24 per cent in 2009–40 per cent of total interconnections
in 2014.86 But the large number of exemptions granted under article 7
Regulation (EU) 994/2010 from the obligation to install reverse ﬂow
capacity leads to a situation where over 50 per cent of interconnectors
still cannot have their gas ﬂows reversed.
This poses a real threat that was recently highlighted, once again, in
a new gas `stress test´ that ENTSO-G had to conduct by November
2017.87 In the event of a new major gas disruption South-Eastern
Member States, namely Romania and Bulgaria, would need to source
gas from Western Europe.88 ENTSO-G found that in case of a 2 month
disruption of all gas imports to the EU via Ukraine, Member States in
South-Eastern Europe would need to curtail their gas demand sig-
niﬁcantly.89 In case of a crisis, gas from Western markets (where di-
versiﬁcation of gas supplies is traditionally more developed and LNG
imports are starting to kick in) could not be transported to the Eastern
European market (where Russia is the big supplier), due to the inability
of gas interconnectors to have their gas ﬂows reversed from West to
East.90 In Romania demand would have to be curtailed by 9 per cent, in
Greece by around 2 per cent, but in Bulgaria 71 per cent of gas demand
would have to be curtailed.91 These numbers look even worse when
modelled for a disruption via the same route during a peak day of ex-
ceptionally high gas demand, arising with a statistical probability of
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once in 20 years.92 Numbers for Bulgaria are looking similarly bleak in
case of disruption of the largest infrastructure to the Balkan region.93
The exemptions from the bi – directional capacity obligation prove,
thus, to be problematic for neuralgic points, although they are not
necessarily restricted to the East-West gas ﬂow, as a number of other
shortcomings concerning Finland, Denmark and Sweden highlight.94
In order to limit the amount of exemptions a procedural novelty is
included in article 5 (4) Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. To obtain an ex-
emption from the obligation to have reverse ﬂow capacity ﬁtted to a gas
interconnector between Member States, a particular template has to be
followed, which is included in Annex III to the Regulation. The idea is
to give Member States clearer guidance on the interpretation of con-
ditions that have to be met to grant an exemption. The overall aim of
the Commission is to limit the amount of exemptions granted and to
narrow the leeway of discretion for Member States.95
However, the question why there is such a huge number of ex-
emptions from the obligation to (retro-)ﬁt interconnectors with reverse
ﬂow capacity goes deeper and touches upon the more conceptual cri-
ticism of Goldberg and others.96 Solidarity can encourage free-riding.97
A country might be inclined to handle its obligatory measures to pre-
vent a shortage in gas supplies more lenient if it knows that there are 27
other countries that `might help out´ in case of a real crisis.
4.2.3. The new solidarity mechanism of article 13 Regulation (EU) 2017/
1938
The new article 13 Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 is trying to counter
this issue. The main stipulation on solidarity in the new security of gas
supply regulation in article 13 (1) reads:
If a Member State has requested the application of the solidarity measure
pursuant to this Article, a Member State which is directly connected to
the requesting Member State or, where the Member State so provides, its
competent authority or transmission system operator or distribution
system operator shall as far as possible without creating unsafe situa-
tions, take the necessary measures to ensure that the gas supply to cus-
tomers other than solidarity protected customers in its territory is reduced
or does not continue to the extent necessary and for as long as the gas
supply to solidarity protected customers in the requesting Member State is
not satisﬁed. The requesting Member State shall ensure that the relevant
volume of gas is eﬀectively delivered to solidarity protected customers in
its territory.`98
According to this article 13 (1) Regulation (EU) 2017/1938, the
directly connected Member State has, thus, to reduce gas ﬂows to
customers, other than `solidarity protected customers´, in case of a
crisis and instead needs to pump the volumes of gas that have been set
free to a Member State requesting solidarity. This must be continued for
as long as supply to `solidarity protected customers´ in the requesting
Member States cannot be satisﬁed. This new mechanisms, hence, re-
quires Member States in such situations to directly interfere with the
markets and the contractual obligations of market players, the con-
sequences of which will be discussed further below.
4.2.4. The new category of `solidarity protected customers´
But what is a `solidarity protected customer´? And how is it related
to the concept of a `protected customer´? Article 2 Regulation (EU)
2017/1938 is providing the Regulation´s deﬁnitions, many of which
already featured in Regulation (EU) 994/2010 and are linked to the Gas
Directive (Directive 2009/73/EC).99 A `solidarity protected customer´,
according to article 2 (6) Regulation (EU) 2017/1938, is `a household
customer who is connected to a gas distribution network, and, in addition,
may include one or both of the following:
(a) a district heating installation if it is a protected customer in the relevant
Member State and only in so far as it delivers heating to households or
essential social services other than educational and public administra-
tion services;
(b) an essential social service if it is a protected customer in the relevant
Member State, other than educational and public administration ser-
vices;` 100
The deﬁnition of `solidarity protected customer´ is thus more
narrow than the deﬁnition of `protected customer´, which features in
article 2 (5) Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 and has been maintained from
Regulation (EU) 994/2010.101 The diﬀerence is that the category of
`protected customer´ can include `small/medium size enterprises´,
whereas such enterprises cannot feature as `solidarity protected cus-
tomer´.102
Moreover, the `solidarity protected customer´- deﬁnition places
further restrictions and qualiﬁcations on the extent to which district
heating installations and essential social services can be qualiﬁed by
Member States as `solidarity protected customers´.103
The Member State providing solidarity can also resort to further
non-market based measures to achieve the aim of providing soli-
darity.104 The requesting Member State is obliged to inform the pro-
viding Member State immediately when it is able to resume supply to its
solidarity protected customers.105
However, according to article 13 (7) Regulation (EU) 2017/1938,
the obligation to provide solidarity in gas is subject to the safe and
reliable operation of the gas system of the Member State that is asked to
provide solidarity and the limit of maximum interconnection export
capacity of the relevant Member State infrastructure towards the re-
questing Member State.
This provision might end up being used as a ﬁrst `exit-gateway´, a
way for Member States that are unwilling to provide solidarity to cir-
cumvent their obligations. Member States have very diﬀerent provi-
sions on the composition of natural gas streams and the possibility to
admix other gases to the streams.106 Member States that are unwilling
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to deliver gas to other Member States in a gas crisis might want to use
these diﬀerent conﬁgurations of the gas stream and other technical as
reasons for abstaining from the solidarity mechanism, based on the
argument that there are limitations to the safe and reliable operation of
the gas system.
4.2.5. Compensation mechanism for market interference under article 13
A crucial factor in limiting such tendencies and encouraging
Member States to interfere with their energy markets and contractual
arrangements of market players is the money that has to be paid as
compensation for the emergency solidarity gas deliveries. Article 13 (8)
Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 is foreseeing a strict and comprehensive
compensation mechanism. The Member State requesting solidarity shall
promptly pay fair compensation to the Member State providing soli-
darity. Such fair compensation shall cover at least the following items:
(a) gas delivered into the territory of the requesting Member State;
(b) all other relevant and reasonable costs incurred when providing soli-
darity, including, where appropriate, costs of such measures that may
have been established in advance;
(c) reimbursement for any compensation resulting from judicial proceed-
ings, arbitration proceedings or similar proceedings and settlements and
related costs of such proceedings involving the Member State providing
solidarity vis-a-vis entities involved in the provision of such solidarity.107
This shall also include all reasonable costs that the Member State,
which is providing solidarity incurs from an obligation to pay com-
pensation by virtue of fundamental rights guaranteed by Union law and
by virtue of the applicable international obligations when im-
plementing this article.108 This is referring to the right of all gas cus-
tomers to be supplied and the possibility that this might have to be
infringed in a crisis on the basis of Regulation (EU) 2017/1938.
Also further reasonable costs incurred from payment of compensa-
tion pursuant to national compensation rules have to be reimbursed.109
This situation might occur when a Member State orders its gas supply
companies in a crisis to restrict supplies to `solidarity protected custo-
mers´. This would mean, as mentioned above, that for example small
and medium sized enterprises could suﬀer supply interruptions. How-
ever, they have a contract with their gas supplier about gas deliveries,
which the gas supply companies are then violating. This can lead to
compensation claims, which the companies can then pass on to the
Member State.
Finally, the requesting Member State also has to compensate all
costs that the Union incurs by virtue of any liability in respect of
measures that Member States are required to take.110 The request of
solidarity, thus, is coming with a heavy price-tag attached to it, which
can make the strategy to rely on other Member States to `help out´ in a
crisis a costly one.
By 1 December 2018 the Member States shall adopt the necessary
measures, in particular decide on technical, legal and ﬁnancial ar-
rangements, to be able to pay the described compensation. The tech-
nical, legal and ﬁnancial arrangements shall be agreed among the
Member States which are directly connected or connected via a non-
Member States and shall be described in their respective emergency
plans.111 Such arrangements may cover the operational safety of
networks, gas prices to be applied and/or the methodology for their
setting, the use of interconnections, gas volumes or the methodology for
their setting, categories of costs that will have to be covered by a fair
and prompt compensation and an indication of the method how the fair
compensation could be calculated.112
Any compensation mechanism shall provide incentives to partici-
pate in market-based solutions such as auctions and demand response
mechanisms.113 It shall not create perverse incentives for market
players to postpone their action until non-market-based measures are
applied. All compensation mechanisms or at least their summary shall
be included in the emergency plans.114
There is a second `exit-gateway´ for Member States, this time for
those that are unwilling to negotiate the described comprehensive ar-
rangements. Article 13 (11) Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 states that a
Member State shall be exempted from the obligation to conclude
technical, legal and ﬁnancial arrangements with directly connected
Member States (or via non-Member States), as long as it can cover the
gas consumption for its `solidarity protected customers´ from its own
production. Such an exemption, however, shall not aﬀect the obligation
of the relevant Member State to provide solidarity to other Member
States.115
A similar exemption has been drawn up speciﬁcally for Denmark
and Sweden (rather unsystematically placed in article 20 (3) Regulation
(EU) 2017/1938). Denmark and Sweden shall be exempted from the
obligation to conclude technical, legal and ﬁnancial arrangements for
the purpose of Sweden providing solidarity to Denmark. This, however,
shall not aﬀect the obligation of Denmark to provide solidarity and to
conclude the necessary technical, legal and ﬁnancial arrangements to
that eﬀect.116
By 1 December 2017 the Commission was obliged to provide gui-
dance for the key elements of the technical, legal and ﬁnancial ar-
rangements.117 However, by the time of writing this guidance docu-
ment was not yet issued.
4.2.6. Resolutions for ambiguities in article 13
There are at least two questions that might be raised in relation to
the mechanisms proposed by the new article 13:
1) What if more than one Member State is directly connected to the
requesting Member State - who has to provide the gas?
2) What if Member States that are directly connected cannot agree on
the technical, legal and ﬁnancial arrangements of compensation?
Question one is answered by article 13 (4) Regulation (EU) 2017/
1938: ` If there is more than one Member State that could provide solidarity
to a requesting Member State, the requesting Member State shall, after
consulting all Member States required to provide solidarity, seek the most
advantageous oﬀer on the basis of cost, speed of delivery, reliability and
diversiﬁcation of supplies of gas.(…)´. The regulation, however, is not
providing a precise mechanism on how these individual components
will have to be interpreted, which means that the interpretation of
terms like reliability and diversiﬁcation of supplies is left to the dis-
cretion of Member States. This could constitute a possible third `exit-
gateway´, with the help of which oﬀers that a Member State might not
like could be declined.118
The second question is answered in article 13 (13) and (14)
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Regulation (EU) 2017/1938. If Member States do not agree on a com-
pensation mechanism by 1 October 2018, the Commission will propose
one, based on its (still to be issued) guidance document. Member States
shall then ﬁnalize their arrangements by 1 December 2018, taking
`utmost account` of the Commission's proposal.119 This curious for-
mulation is an indicator that the Commission will not have the ﬁnal say
on the matter. Indeed, article 13 (14) Regulation (EU) 2017/1938
prescribes that if Member States fail to agree or ﬁnalize their technical,
legal and ﬁnancial arrangements, they only have to agree on the ne-
cessary ad hoc measures in case of a crisis.
Finally, Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 stresses at several points120
that solidarity shall be a measure of last resort, which applies only in an
emergency and is subject to several restrictive conditions. A Member
State that is declaring an emergency should ﬁrst take all measures it has
available to resolve the situation before calling upon the solidarity of
other Member States.121 This emphasis on solidarity as a last resort is a
result of the opposition of Member States towards the inclusion of a
strict solidarity mechanism. It can also be seen as a ﬁnal attempt by the
Commission to discourage `free riding´ and encourage Member States
to have robust arrangements in place to save themselves in a crisis.
5. Conclusion
The big theme of the new security of gas supply regulation is `so-
lidarity´. The EU put into place a number of new measures to that ex-
tent. However, they also include some `exit gateways´ for Member
States that are unwilling to participate to the full extent. Moreover,
there is still considerable leeway for discretion of Member States, for
instance in cases where multiple Member States could potentially pro-
vide solidarity. In these cases the Member State receiving solidarity
could `steer´ its decision towards countries with which it already has a
strong relationship via its interpretation of terms like reliability and
diversiﬁcation of supplies. This might lead to situations where not the
optimal, most eﬃcient solution is being selected. It is also interesting to
note that renewable gases are not considered by Regulation (EU) 2017/
1938.
The fact that there are numerous little exemptions and conﬁnements
to the solidarity provisions is merely a manifestation in law of an un-
derlying problem. The debates about the composition of risk groups
showcased that Member States are reluctant to participate in the pro-
posed solidarity mechanisms and are cautiously watching their sover-
eignty over energy matters. Against this backdrop the new provisions
constitute a big step and could be deemed as a considerable `win´ for
the Commission. But as previous gas crises have shown, the words on
paper are not worth much if there is no willingness to comply when
push comes to shove.
Ultimately, this ties in with the more conceptual discussion on what
energy justice is and what `just´ energy transitions could look like. Both
Heﬀron/McCauley on the one hand and Sovacool et al. on the other
hand developed criteria for energy justice.122 An in-depth assessment
and discussion of the varying criteria lies beyond the scope of this ar-
ticle. However, as Heﬀron and McCauley pointed out, energy justice,
reduced to its simplest form, refers to the application of human rights
across the energy life-cycle (from cradle to grave).123 This energy jus-
tice concept of itself is part of a broader concept of `just transition`.
Besides energy justice there are two other components of a just tran-
sition. On the one hand climate justice concerns (sharing the beneﬁts
and burdens of climate change from a human rights perspective) and on
the other hand environmental justice (aiming to treat all citizens
equally and to involve them in the development, implementation and
enforcement of environmental law, regulations and policies).124
From the application of these concepts to the new gas security of
supply regulation three policy recommendations/implications can be
drawn. First, solidarity in gas supply security needs to be strengthened.
The EU institutions need to reﬂect on the need to put positive incentives
for solidarity into place (the ﬁnancial compensation mechanism being a
ﬁrst, very tentative step). This is because, second, the imposition of
solidarity in a top-down manner proved to be not very successful in the
past in Regulation (EU) 994/2010. As the analysis of the EU`s own
institutions as well as others, such as ENTSO-G, highlight, the problem
has been that Member States did not trust and believe that a gas soli-
darity mechanism can work in the EU. The political task for the EU
institutions is to convince Member States of the numerous advantages of
a solidarity mechanism. To just force and impose solidarity with a
legislative `iron bar´ will not create the feeling, the spirit of solidarity
that is needed for Member States. The EU should change the way in
which it tries to bring Member States to `live` gas solidarity – in short:
seduce rather than punish them. This is also supported by legal theory
research into `good` regulation, which is showing that a regulation
works best if it is not entirely opposed to the inner will and motivation
of the regulated.125
This leads to the third and ﬁnal policy recommendation of this ar-
ticle. It is crucial for the EU to clarify the role and function it has vis-à-
vis EU Member States in gas supply security. This, again, touches upon
the `energy justice` concept, but also on the participatory component of
a `just transition`, insofar as the `fundamental right` of sovereignty over
natural resources that states are enjoying, has been limited by article
194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
Article 194 TFEU, in essence, reserves certain areas of energy policy
and regulation to the EU Member States, while transferring others to
the EU-level. The EU and the Member States need to better negotiate
what their respective roles are in gas security of supply. However, such
diﬃcult negotiations can only succeed if the EU is convincing (rather
than forcing Member States to accept) that solidarity mechanisms for
gas within the EU have a vital role to play.
119 Article 13 (13) Regulation (EU) 2017/1938.
120 Preambles 38–42, articles 1, 13 (3) Regulation (EU) 2017/1938.
121 Preamble 38 Regulation (EU) 2017/1938.
122 Sovacool 356 et sqq; a good overview of the diﬀerent criteria is provided
by Heﬀron/McCauley 2017 at 660.
123 Heﬀron/McCauley 2018 at 74.
124 Heﬀron/McCauley 2018 at 74.
125 For an introduction to `good` regulation see Robert Baldwin Martin Cave
and Martin Lodge `Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice`
second edition (Oxford University Press 2011).
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